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All those who, like myself, practise their profession with 
enthusiasm, will greet, with satisfaction, the news of any 
technical advance that can accelerate the development of 
their discipline. However, that enthusiasm needs to be 
tempered by the caution that comes with experience, a 
caution, which I suggest should be maintained, until it has 
been ascertained whether the newly available technology 
meets our scientific standards and requirements, or rather, 
hails from the latest, para-scientific consumer fads and the 
communications market. Ideally, this caution should persist, 
until we have discovered whether the "progress on offer", 
merely serves to mask archaeological problems, by dressing 
them up, or wrapping them, in the most expensive and 
alluring products, manufactured by the most, sought-after 
companies. If this turned out to be the case, in a relatively 
short period of time archaeology would come to be perceived 
as the dictated fashion of the day, either opulent and 
spendthrift or meagre and mean. Such caution advises us, 
now, more than ever before, to remember the story of the 
emperor's "new clothes", that all his subjects were obliged to 
say they could see, so as not to appear ignorant. Only an 
innocent child, who had not yet learned to play the game, 
dared to speak the truth, and say that "the king had no clothes 
on". 
What I propose, therefore, is that we should keep our focus 
keen and clear, trained on what we are really after, so that the 
techniques for seeing do not cancel out our capacity to look. 
My premise is that archaeology is a historical science, which 
deals with the concrete, material remains that social practices 
leave or have left behind; from these remains, it abstracts 
concepts, which group together, it establishes categories, 
which link concepts and things to the time and space, which 
define them, and attempts to test those categories against 
concrete reaüty, in order to learn about the past, present and 
future. Its proposed objective is to investigate societies 
through History, and through their own individual histories, 
on the basis of material evidence. 
So far, I have discussed the ideal objective, stated according 
to the premise of material reality. However, archaeological 
science cannot hope to achieve this objective, without the 
means of scientific production. 
This conference marks an attempt to bring together different 
resources, that can be applied to archaeology, and which our 
society has implemented, as a result of its own requirements 
for material and ideological production. These resources 
come, in most cases, from other branches of science, whose 
technology can be used to further research in archaeology. 
The first issue to be discussed is the genealogy of these 
resources,   inasmuch   as   they   are   potential   means   of 
archaeological production. Means, which were conceived for 
one particular purpose, may also be used for others, since the 
subject using those means is apparently independent of the 
object, to which they are applied. However, we cannot afford 
to be over-optimistic, concerning their neutrality in the 
scientific process, and we should state, straight away, that the 
means are not mere, passive elements in that process. 
Researchers use this or that instrument, not only according to 
the segment under observation: on the contrary, they are also 
obliged to emphasise, in their research, the aspects, peculiar 
to the new tools they are using. The observer should be 
aware that the means, themselves, open up new avenues of 
research, and that these new avenues have been opened, in 
response to interests and intentions, other thanthose of the 
observer. Thus, technical means involve a kind of targeted 
research, since they derive from interested and mutually 
dependent links, between the subject (market) and the object 
(products). 
The majority of technological resources presented in this 
forum, are typical of the so-called. Third Indusfrial 
Revolution. Computers and advanced telecommunications 
media are termed "transversal" technologies, because they 
increase productivity in all the sectors, to which they are 
apphed'. This has paved the way for increased rates, for 
capitalist profit, at a time when the accumulation of capital, 
based on the products from the Second Industrial Revolution 
(steel and automobiles), has peaked out. Control of these 
"transversal" technologies, in fact, entails a monopoly of 
world production, which, at the present time, is exercised by 
the United States and its G7 customers. 
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to accept that "high 
technology" originates solely from private initiatives, which 
put their trademark on the packaging. First, we should never 
forget that the research, which made the development of 
these technologies possible, has been financed, to a great 
extent, by the syphoning off of public funds to private 
enterprises, in the central capitalist countries. Second, the 
production and assembly of the components, which make up 
these technological wonders, are carried out by a growing 
body of slave labourers in the Third World. Finally, and so as 
to lose, albeit symbolically, our last shred of innocence, we 
should remember that, in many cases, these technologies 
were originally destined for miUtary use, and have 
subsequently been "civilianised": in connection to this, we 
might mention instruments for télédétection and global 
positioning by satelhte, as well as geographical data systems. 
Therefore, we suspect that the means at our disposal are less 
neutral than they seem, because they have been created, 
empowered, and "paid for" by, and for, a set of specific - 
See N. Chomsky and H. Dieterich: The Global Village 
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always hegemonic - interests; in other words, the interests of 
the oligarchies, which make us believe that the demand 
creates the supply. It is, therefore, vital to establish a 
criterion of independence from the means that we use, even 
though both ends and means are intimately related to the 
material conditions that bring them about. 
In order to suggest what the archaeology of tomorrow will 
look like, we must first investigate the archaeology of today, 
an unfathomable problem, if we do not investigate the 
ft-amework of material conditions, within which our 
discipline moves. As we do so, we see that, because it is a 
by-product of the scientific hierarchy, archaeology, today, 
polarises the same contradictions as the society, in which our 
so-called science is rooted. 
Nowadays, science (including archaeology) and the debate in 
society, in general, oscillate between the poles and radical 
tensions, surrounding the concepts of causality and 
indeterminism, particularity and totality, and reason and 
sensitivity. At the same time, we see the simultaneous 
emergence of philosophies and practices, which aim to 
deconstruct those polarities, their purpose being to refute 
identities, by means of dijférances^, to dispense with human 
beings, by means of scattered multiplicities, and to question 
common objective situations, by vindicating the self as the 
peculiar and intimate starting-point. This latter path of 
subjective idealism, which is highly fruitful in the 
proliferation of collage texts, is grounded in the exaltation of 
the critical, free-thinking individual, but is based on the self- 
sufficiency, which comes from being a conscious or 
unconscious by-product of the oligarchy and its power; such 
an individual has, or is endowed with, the material 
conditions, by means of which he can carry out this critique 
of segregation (ideally, changing everything, while 
substantially changing nothing, regarding material 
conditions), perpetuating asymmetries and social differences, 
and defending the politics of tolerance, which basically 
"respect" the gulf in material conditions, separating those 
who dictate from those who accept being dictated to, in order 
to survive. 
Many of my colleagues and I suspect (with good reason) 
that the technological means, we import into our science, are 
suffused with that subjective idealism, which derives from all 
the theoretical tendencies, upheld by the patriarchs of "single 
thought"^ These patriarchs, who, acting as the masters of 
ceremonies for idealistic stances, defend the diversity of 
ideas, while at the same time, taking care to ensure that 
material differences are left unchanged. We suspect that the 
applications, we incorporate into archaeological research, are 
the product of and, at the same time, the producers of the 
new style of life, in which rigourous, scientific observation 
takes second place to the accurate, graphic fransfer of 
images, or the precision or definition, with which they are 
processed. This subterfuge makes them more suitable for 
reproducing the desired lifestyle of the ruling classes, of our 
late capitaUst society, and which offers products that, as soon 
as they are put on the market, require consumers; and, if they 
are not consumed, the train of development will grind to a 
See J. Derrida. De la Grammatologie. Paris 1967. 
'     SuccesfiiU  term  proposed  by  I.   Ramonet,  director of Le  Monde 
Diplomatique ("La Pensée Unique") 
halt. The question is: under what conditions should we catch 
that ttain, change its destination, or act, in order to avoid 
being run down by it? 
The main problem which concerns me is: what is involved in 
the production of new technologies, and how does it 
consume us? 
We belong to a society, which ideally presents itself as a 
"global village" and which, thanks to the development of the 
media, imposes a forum, that is in all places, at all times. In 
this forum, single or uniform thought is not a probability, nor 
does it pose a paradox, as regards the supposed, free thought 
of individuals, put forward by the constitutions of western 
democracies. The strength of "single thought" lies in that it 
allows all free, individual expression, as long as it respects 
the pattern of hegemonic thought. Both the democratic 
consensus, concerning the free exchange of information, and 
the tension of confrontation conform to this way of seeing 
the world, since all confrontation requires, like consensus, a 
space in which conciliation or negotiation can take place, as 
well as a power structure, that can safeguard the rules. And 
what better forum could there be than that of a single, and, 
supposedly, plural thought, which crystalises into an idea of 
equal opportunity (that is anathema to material difference), 
and avoids the unprescribed and unprofitable resolution of 
diversity! That is why single thought is not a probability, just 
as it is not probable that 200 multi-nationals can control 
more than a quarter of the world's economic activity. The 
single thought is an ideological option, the symbol of a 
universe of forms, which continually sfrives to ensure that 
we are characterised by this historical asymmetry. 
It appears paradoxical that the development of 
communications, or information, can lead us to the 
totalitarian, blind alley of the "single thought" and the 
"global village". The supposed paradox, at least, illusfrates 
that the development of those media has nothing to do with 
what they actually communicate, or rather, that the 
development has been possible, because the channels of 
communication have, to quote a famous phrase by the 
dictator Francisco Franco, been "fastened and well-fastened". 
All hegemonic systems have chinks in them; and, the crack 
in the giddy development of communication allows us to slip 
through, just as these suggestions of mine have found their 
way into a pragmatic meeting, to discuss instrumental 
methodologies: are those of us, who hold academic office, 
the only ones who can achieve such a thing, or perhaps, it is 
only those who enjoy the right, material conditions, who can 
raise these issues with clarity and greater official authority, 
that is to say, without the need for some insurance policy, 
since they already enjoy the safety net of an institutional, life 
insurance policy? 
This meeting gives us a unique opportunity to acquaint 
ourselves with a number of technological means, capable of 
solving many of our archaeological problems. However, 
these means will not determine the kinds of historical 
questions, we wish to ask; they will not even provide us with 
the way to formulate those questions. The means do not 
automatically construct the world; but, only through their 
dialectical relationship with the social conditions, which give 
rise to them, can the world be constructed. Nevertheless, the 
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use of those means will open up a wide new set of problems, 
since every instrument, as a subject of information, adds new 
matter to the world, and, as such, deserves attention. That 
attention should hinge, not on the means themselves, but 
rather, should investigate the dialectic of the social relations, 
in which it originates. This investigation is, in itself, an 
archaeological problem, with which we can properly concern 
ourselves, as even the means, in question, may hail from 
some archaeological version of the single thought, that 
defender of the diversity of ideas, which all the while ensures 
that material differences are maintained (or go unnoticed). 
The problem with archaeology, both in an absolute sense and 
in its spatio-temporal peculiarities, is not formulated through 
means, but through the historical research, which relies on 
them, and on the work accumulated by other material 
conditions, which employed means of another kind. 
None of the technological means, on display at this meeting, 
were created from within the field of archaeology, a fact 
which illustrates the scant impact that our science has on 
society and confirms that the fetish value of objects 
continues to underlie the public's understanding of this 
discipline. I fear that there is currently a movement to attract 
the public wdth technographical, super-productions, which 
give dimension to the playfiil idealism of the contemplation 
of the object, by means of another, cybernetics-based 
contemplation of the illustration of that same object, which 
has lost the "charm" of being old. 
There is a danger that our public face will become a mere 
simulacrum, behind which is hidden our own technocratic 
image, consisting of drawings, photography, animation, or 
three-dimensional images, and which will gradually become 
the identity card of all those who forget that it is merely a 
club-membership card. 
In my opinion, archaeologists' interest in new technologies 
does not stem, merely, from a wish to see their work 
illusfrated, using the most, up-to-date methods. This 
conference can provide us with a good opportunity, to show 
that we use the means, at our disposal, in order to investigate 
society, and not simply to see it, without acmally looking at 
it. 
We shall have to listen very closely to those of our 
colleagues, who have been courageous enough to board the 
train of development, in order to determine whether the 
destination, to which they intend to take us, is the same one 
proposed by the social hegemony, which permitted the train, 
the tracks and the stations to be built. If so, then the use of 
that train automatically implies the perception that 
development requires no other tracks or destinations. 
Who proposed the construction of that train in the first place? 
With what aims? What underlies the line of its application to 
archaeology, and why? What are the objectives of 
archaeological research: to fmd the means to illustrate, or the 
means to investigate? If the latter is the case, which new 
segments do those means allow us to investigate? 
Our society is educating girls and boys, through new means, 
that form part of the same package: computers, muhi-media 
texts... We are forging physical and metaphysical links. 
between ourselves and those new objects, which will, in their 
turn, shape new individuals, who will become virtual 
subjects, unless they are fashioned into social beings, by 
relations and practices of another kind. 
I am sure that this conference will be an opportunity to 
discover that what is being proposed, in the various 
communications, will not support the emergence of a virtual 
archaeology, and that the technological means, presented and 
used here, are useful for the purposes of research, and not 
merely, to show what has been extracted from the 
associations of observed phenomena, thanks to complex 
computer programs. We shall see that the use of these means 
has been of fundamental importance, in verifying historical 
hypotheses. Hopefully, the various communications, during 
this conference, will show us that the contribution of 
archaeological cybernetics is not to lure us into a kind of 
Persian market, where we can marvel at, consume, and 
export all the wonders of the world, but rather, to provide us 
with independent, instrumental methods, capable of 
validating or, at least, facilitating the historical explanation, 
that all scientific archaeology seeks to give. 
It would be equally reassuring to find alternative ways of 
opening up that world to everybody (alternatives which 
would lead the new technologies out of the competitive 
markets, in which they are produced), or to find some 
explanation, capable of solving the paradox, between the 
production market (in which they are created) and the 
marketplace of knowledge (which they may herald). This 
latter marketplace will continue to be marked by inequality, 
as long as there are some archaeologists, who do not have 
access to those means. While realising that it is very difficult 
for archaeologists to propose changes to social systems, I feel 
that it is also part of our mission to conduct an archaeological 
analysis of who it is, that enjoys the material conditions, and 
why we are privileged,and at the expense of whom ,or what. 
I'm afraid that it may be our own alienation, which causes us 
to construct alienated discourses on the past. 
Let us consider how far the development of the means of 
production, in the form of new technologies, takes us away 
from the objectives of archaeological research. Let us 
analyse the new proposal of scientific communication, 
advocated by the Third Industrial Revolution. Just as 
television (with very little opposition on our part) has ceased 
to be a mere means of communication and has become one 
more member of all our families, so computers (aside from 
providing us with the best system we have been able to 
devise for creating archives, documentation and data sorting) 
may become the indispensable mechanism, underpinning all 
social order. They may even dictate that social order, under 
the guise of components in the game of probabilities for 
oligarchic social reproduction. 
My concern is not the result of an obsolete stance, aimed at 
standing in the way of technical progress, or putting 
humanistic stumbling blocks in the path of technological 
development. On the contrary, what worries me are the 
absurdities, obscured by the misuse of certain technological 
means, in fields where they do not solve problems, in the 
contexts to which they are applied; for example, I cite the 
misguided use of funds, in school and university libraries. 
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which result from the need to replace existing computers and 
networks every few years. 
The imperatives of the market mean that machines become 
obsolete, at the same rate that competition, among multi- 
nationals, leads to the introduction of improvements in their 
products. This social cost means that the budgets, allotted to 
the academic infrastructure, are also affected, as regards 
other vital aspects to the proper education of social beings, 
including the recruitment of additional qualified teachers, the 
improvement of library or laboratory stocks (for both 
teaching and research purposes), as well as a large number of 
other, student-oriented services, which do not require hi-tech 
means. 
Critical rigour requires that we define our position, regarding 
society's expectations of archaeologists, making it clear to 
the social authorities, exactly what the needs of archaeology 
are. We agree that while social government requires 
technical experts, to bring down management costs and step 
in as trouble-shooters, such figures have little in common 
with scientific, historical research. Therefore, for our part, 
and in order to avoid being a mere by-product of the 
government, we should express to our governments, our own 
scientific-methodological requirements in the fraining of 
those experts, together with a level of professional skill, that 
is not confined to the indiscriminate knowledge of 
techniques and apparatus. 
Nowadays, computers are necessary, although social 
education and training were always necessary, with or 
without computers. The possession of these powerful, 
technological resources will not, in itself, enable us to 
enhance the quality of life, nor of scientific research, or the 
system of social relations; we shall merely resolve, thereby, 
quantitative problems of processed information and spare a 
small number of individuals, concentrated in the West, the 
effort of classifying, sorting and processing data. We shall 
also have the advantage of illustrating reality, in the most 
faithful manner we can, though illustrating is not 
synonymous to emulating (nor do these two concepts 
necessarily imply development). They may, in fact, 
constitute a giddy spiral, which obliges us to think that the 
only thing we can be sure of is that we cannot get off the 
treadmill. 
It is not the speed, with which data is processed, that will 
allow us to solve our problems; rather, it is a parallel and 
genuinely, independent experiment, that will enable an 
explanation for them to be found. Experiment involves a 
proposition from outside the data, from a 
reality/perception/abstraction sphere of relations, which 
creates, in our thoughts, a synthesis, that overcomes the 
subject/object dialectic. 
Computers are not simultaneously the subject, object, and 
possible relationships, that these may engender, but they are 
made to look as if they did, in fact, embody that relational 
synthesis. The hardware simulates an object, which is 
subjectivised in the software. According to the advertising 
that we absorb, computer programs would appear to be like 
little leprechauns, or angels, solving all our multiplication 
problems, without our having to learn our times tables. This 
leads to a perception, which causes us to think that machines 
(with their little program-producing leprechauns inside, now 
on sale in the shape of computer applications) are, for the 
price of a few hundred thousand pesetas, going to succeed in 
the tasks, that our social or scientific education has failed to 
achieve. 
One needs only to look at the power, reflected on the face of 
any receptionist, secretary or researcher, answering our 
enquiries from behind a computer screen; it is as if the 
computer contained the magic key to all the answers, as if its 
user had access to some super-human power. Yet this power 
is only a metaphor for the social values, imposed by the 
West, and for its control over all other societies, and which 
is, despite appearances, the most human of powers: that 
which allows us to own an almost pocket-sized copy of the 
world, a little device, which proposes us to be the ideal 
proprietors of a concrete universe, to which we have access, 
but which we can only enjoy in a virtual sense. 
As individuals, who both produce and consume knowledge, 
we are obliged to marshal all the theoretical arguments 
possible, in order to understand why we are confining 
ourselves to consuming alien realities, and why we are being 
forced to measure our own realities, in terms of those other 
means. Those arguments need to be able to determine the 
extent, to which the present schizophrenia of the media is 
swerving us from the prospect of producing new realities. To 
sum up, we suggest that rigourous scrutiny should be applied 
to any archaeological cybernetics, that does not propound its 
instrumental relation to social archaeology. 
The eruption of technology into the social sciences and 
everyday life, in general, involves two, age-old, ethical and 
scientific positions. The first stems from wary, traditional 
humanism and equates technology with "dehumanization", 
expressing contempt for the new formal languages, while the 
second considers technification to be intrinsically positive, 
and welcomes any new product, that allows any kind of 
advance, or anything that at least resembles it, in whatever 
field. Both of these liberal tendencies go hand in hand with 
the property of things, with the ideas and ideal of 
competition, which, in any case, uphold the market, as the 
only forum for exchange, which can give rise to social 
values. Both make ends and means equal, and argue in 
favour of supposedly pure schools of archaeology (the 
former being essentialist, whereas the latter is aseptic). And, 
both advocate success as the basic indicator of quality. 
On the contrary, we propose an archaeology, which aims to 
give an account of the material conditions, that social reality 
needs, in order to reproduce itself, while being receptive to 
the technological innovations, that such an objective 
requires. It must be a rigourously social archaeology, which, 
by means of scientific criticism, will avoid the situation, 
whereby archaeologists are forced to approach their work 
from a narrowly descriptive, archivistic or cartographic 
perspective, supporting a technological future as philatelic 
and idealistic as traditional archaeology. A future, whose 
only attraction is the better quality of its snapshots and its 
more sophisticated recording techniques. A future, which 
augures didactic methods, characterised by the strong imprint 
of media competition, aimed at achieving social success, 
proclaimed by eye-catching images, that are easy to look at 
and digest, and that are empty of any kind of social content. 
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